One of the things that is key is to understand — really and truly understand — the environment that you’re working in. You know, if you live in the YouTube age, don’t give major speeches in front of a blue screen. That sort of thing.
This article is a good example of this: in football, if an average rushing play gains about 4 yards, but the average passing play earns 6 yards, doesn’t it stand to reason that we should see more passing? Currently, according to the Author, quarterbacks pass only 54% of the time. Shouldn’t that be higher?
The downside of using metrics is to not fully understand what they represent. As the article briefly discusses and glosses over, the rush play usually sets up the pass. If linebackers can stay back knowing they don’t have to respect the passrun, then pass percentages will plummet. Also, a failed pass stops the clock, whereas a rush that is stuffed does not. Most successful teams (such as Indianapolis and New England of recent years) pass to build a lead, then rush to defend it.
Moreover, one must consider what is the true currency of a football game. Sabermetric nuts know that, in baseball, if you can’t get a homerun, the most valuable thing you can do is to not get an out. Your team only gets 27 outs, so as long as you have a team full of people with high on-base-averages, runs will happen eventually.
In football, the most important thing you can do short of scoring is getting a first down. And first downs, peculiarly, are a little better earned via rushing than passing. Why? Because almost every rush will get you a few yards. The six plus yard average from passing is bloated. The average factors in a lot of 30, 40 and 50 yard passes, which helps disguise the fact that a lot of passes bounce off the turf. A top-notch passer like Tom Brady has a completion percentage of about 60%. Just ignoring all the short passes hidden by the long ones, this translates to a lot of 3-and-outs, which other than giving your opponent good field position, also keeps the opposing defense fresh and well rested.
It is possible to just ride that, and live by the percentages, winning on the big strike. This is the formula to success that Peyton Manning rode in his ridiculously potent 2004 campaign. He was deadly accurate, and lived off the big toss – his 67% competion rate and 9.2 yards per attempt were ridiculous. The problem? His team was scoring so fast that his own defense was spending more time on the field, getting exhausted. The net result: every game became a shootout, and they became woefully unprepared when the Patriots came prepared to contain Manning.
Could you build a football plan around passing more? Sure – that’s what the West Coast Offense is all about. But then again, the West Coast Offense is built in order to manage the deficiencies of just straight up slinging the ball down the field – short passes to the sides force the defense to commit (similar to what run plays do in a standard defense), which opens up opportunities for longer strikes. The WCO is a thing of beauty in the hands of a quarterback, but is a very difficult system to instill in a team – its complexity is one reason why it does so well in the NFL, but hasn’t had as much success in the college ranks.
Anyway, enough late night musings from me. More game stuff soon.
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